Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt / Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang

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cbs.date.changed2021-07-27
cbs.date.creation2016-06-24
cbs.picatypeOa
cbs.publication.displayformHalle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), June 2016
dc.contributor.authorColonnello, Stefano
dc.contributor.authorCuratola, Giuliano
dc.contributor.authorHoang, Ngoc Giang
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-28T22:48:05Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt.de
dc.format.extent1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten, 1,19 MB) : Illustrationen
dc.genrebook
dc.identifier.ppn86191855X
dc.identifier.urihttps://epflicht.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/handle/123456789/3309
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-57815
dc.identifier.vl-id2438338
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHalle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIWH-Diskussionspapiere ; no. 20/2016 ppn:837399270
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.titleDirect and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt / Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
dc.typeBook
dspace.entity.typeMonograph
local.accessrights.itemAnonymous
local.openaccesstrue

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Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
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