Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt / Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
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Discovery
86191855X
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-57815
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Autorin / Autor
Beiträger
Körperschaft
Erschienen
Halle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), June 2016
Umfang
1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten, 1,19 MB) : Illustrationen
Ausgabevermerk
Sprache
eng
Anmerkungen
Inhaltliche Zusammenfassung
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt.
Schriftenreihe
IWH-Diskussionspapiere ; no. 20/2016 ppn:837399270