Interactions between regulatory and corporate taxes : how is bank leverage affected? / Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
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Discovery
1031380256
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-97141
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Autorin / Autor
Beiträger
Körperschaft
Erschienen
Halle (Saale) : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, [24. September 2018]
Umfang
1 Online-Ressource (III, 32 Seiten, 0,92 MB) : Diagramme
Ausgabevermerk
Sprache
eng
Anmerkungen
Inhaltliche Zusammenfassung
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
Schriftenreihe
IWH-Diskussionspapiere ; 2018, no. 16 (September 2018) ppn:837399270