Equilibrium selection and simple signaling games / Michael Mitzkewitz
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Equilibrium selection and simple signaling games
Discovery
895076985
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-75421
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Publication history
Magdeburg : Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, [2017]
Content
1 Online-Ressource (63 Seiten = 2,59 MB) : Illustrationen
Edition
Language
eng
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Abstract
This paper calculates the Harsanyi-Selten solutions for a class of simple signaling games. This means that for each generic game belonging to this class one of its equilibrium points is selected according to the principles developed by John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (Harsanyi & Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, 1988). For almost fifty years signaling games have been of great interest for both normative game theorists and scientists interested in the analysis of social, cultural and biological phenomena. The paper provides an introduction into the Harsanyi-Selten theory, solves all generic games and subsumes the results. Thus comparisons to Nash refinement concepts can easily be done and the solution of more complex games is facilitated.
Series
Working paper series ; no. 2017, 9 ppn:58927368X