Management opposition, strikes and union threat / Patrick Nüß ; editor: Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
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Management opposition, strikes and union threat Discovery
1939603382
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-123456789-1177876
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Koordinaten
Skalierung
Autorin / Autor
Beiträger
Körperschaft
Erschienen
Halle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, 2025
Umfang
1 Online-Ressource (III, 31 Seiten, Seite A1-A32, 3,37 MB) : Diagramme
Ausgabevermerk
Sprache
eng
Anmerkungen
Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 27-31
Inhaltliche Zusammenfassung
I estimate management opposition to unions in terms of hiring discrimination in the German labor market. By sending 13,000 fictitious job applications, revealing union membership in the CV and pro-union sentiment via social media accounts, I provide evidence for hiring discrimination against union supporters. Callback rates are on average 15% lower for union members. Discrimination is strongest in the presence of a high sectoral share of union members and large firm size. I further explore variation in regional and sectoral strike intensity over time and find suggestive evidence that discrimination increases if a sector is exposed to an intense strike. Discrimination is positively associated with the sectoral share of firms that voluntarily orientate wages to collective agreements. These results indicate that hiring discrimination can be explained by union threat effects.
Schriftenreihe
IWH discussion papers ; 2025, no. 17 (October 2025) ppn:837399270