Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies : transparency, opacity, and secrecy / Axel Lindner
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Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies
Discovery
577024639
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-7334
DOI
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Author
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Publication history
Halle (Saale) : Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung, Aug. 2008
Content
Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S.) : graph. Darst.
Edition
Language
eng
Comment
Zsfassungen in dt. und engl. Sprache
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information. -- transparency ; private information ; common knowledge
Series
IWH-Diskussionspapiere ; 2008,8 ppn:37244492X