Effectiveness and (in)efficiencies of compensation regulation : evidence from the EU banker bonus cap / Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
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Discovery
1041424132
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-100806
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Autorin / Autor
Beiträger
Körperschaft
Erschienen
Halle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, 2018
Umfang
1 Online-Ressource (III, 69 Seiten, 1,54 MB) : Diagramme
Ausgabevermerk
This version: November 22, 2018
Sprache
eng
Anmerkungen
Datei wurde von der herausgebenden Institution entfernt
Inhaltliche Zusammenfassung
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation did not induce an executive director exodus from EU banking because banks raised fixed compensation sufficiently to retain executives. However, risk-adjusted bank performance deteriorated, consistent with reduced incentives to exert effort and insurance effects associated with fixed compensation components. We also find that banks with directors that are more affected by the bonus cap exhibit more systemic as well as systematic risk. This result casts doubts on the effectiveness of the policy to achieve its aim to enhance financial stability.
Schriftenreihe
IWH-Diskussionspapiere ; 2018, no. 7 (April 2018) [rev.] ppn:837399270