The reverse revolving door in the supervision of European banks / Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Alex Sclip, Konstantin Wagner ; editor: Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
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The reverse revolving door in the supervision of European banks Discovery
1980037116
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-123456789-1197657
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Koordinaten
Skalierung
Beiträger
Körperschaft
Erschienen
Halle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, 2026
Umfang
1 Online-Ressource (III, 39 Seiten, 0,97 MB) : Diagramme
Ausgabevermerk
This version: July 10, 2026
Sprache
eng
Anmerkungen
Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 24-25
Inhaltliche Zusammenfassung
We assemble data about executives on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking, which reveal that 40% have an employment history in the financial industry. Appointment patterns to NSA boards differ substantially across countries. Generally, the appointment of former finance professionals as prudential supervisors is inconsequential for banks‘ valuations, capitalization, and asset growth. The exception are positive, but short-lived valuation effects for those banks whose alumni are appointed as executives of directly responsible NSA boards. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a “proximity bias“ is a more likely driver of this effect instead of superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of the designated NSA executives.
Schriftenreihe
IWH discussion papers ; 2023, no. 25 (December 2023) [rev.] ppn:837399270