Common ownership and CEO social ties across portfolio firms / Dennis Hutschenreiter, Qianshuo Liu ; editor: Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
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Common ownership and CEO social ties across portfolio firms
Discovery
1973305100
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-123456789-1196621
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Publication history
Halle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, 2026
Content
1 Online-Ressource (III, 68 Seiten, 1,03 MB) : Diagramme
Edition
Language
eng
Comment
Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 38-41
Abstract
This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.
Series
IWH discussion papers ; 2026, no. 9 (June 2026) ppn:837399270