Who invests in training if contracts are temporary? : Empirical evidence for Germany using selection correction / Jan Sauermann
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Who invests in training if contracts are temporary?
Discovery
516064959
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-1223
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Publication history
Halle : Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2006
Content
Online-Ressource (Text, 233 kB)
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Language
eng
Comment
Abstract
This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.
Series
IWH-Diskussionspapiere ; 2006,14 ppn:37244492X