Intangible assets and imperfections in product and labor markets / Eric Bartelsman, Sabien Dobbelaere, Alessandro Zona Mattioli ; editor: Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
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Intangible assets and imperfections in product and labor markets
Discovery
1970446218
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-123456789-1188589
DOI
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Publication history
Halle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, 2026
Content
1 Online-Ressource (III, 22, 52 Seiten, 1,64 MB) : Diagramme
Edition
Language
eng
Comment
Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 47-52
Abstract
This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.
Series
IWH discussion papers ; 2026, no. 5 (May 2026) ppn:837399270