Inefficient intra-firm incentives can stabilize cartels in Cournot oligopolies / Roland Kirstein; Annette Kirstein

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cbs.date.changed2022-03-27
cbs.date.creation2014-07-21
cbs.picatypeOa
cbs.publication.displayformMagdeburg : Univ., FEMM, 2007
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Roland
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Annette
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-28T17:11:09Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.format.extentOnline-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S., 0,22 MB) : graph. Darst.
dc.genrebook
dc.identifier.ppn790832437
dc.identifier.urihttps://epflicht.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/handle/123456789/1292
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-29830
dc.identifier.vl-id1984338
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniv., FEMM
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series ; 2007,4 ppn:58927368X
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc338
dc.titleInefficient intra-firm incentives can stabilize cartels in Cournot oligopolies / Roland Kirstein; Annette Kirstein
dc.typeBook
dspace.entity.typeMonograph
local.accessrights.itemAnonymous
local.openaccesstrue

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