Regional banking instability and FOMC voting / Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner, Felix Noth
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Discovery
859169065
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-54629
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Autorin / Autor
Beiträger
Körperschaft
Erschienen
Halle (Saale), Germany : Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), Mai 2016
Umfang
1 Online-Ressource (III, 54 Seiten, 0,83 MB) : Illustrationen
Ausgabevermerk
Sprache
eng
Anmerkungen
Inhaltliche Zusammenfassung
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
Schriftenreihe
IWH-Diskussionspapiere ; no. 15/2016 ppn:837399270