Does too much transparency of central banks prevent agents from using their private information efficiently? / Axel Lindner
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Does too much transparency of central banks prevent agents from using their private information efficiently?
Discovery
557273986
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-6304
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Author
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Publication history
Halle (Saale) : Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2007
Content
Online-Ressource, 18 S.=178 KB, Text
Edition
Language
eng
Comment
Zsfassungen in dt. und engl. Sprache
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge. -- transparency ; private information ; common knowledge
Series
IWH-Diskussionspapiere ; 2007,16 ppn:37244492X