Managing labor under monetary instability - experimental evidence on wage and effort inertia / Karina Held/Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Loading...
Download997.98 KB
Managing labor under monetary instability - experimental evidence on wage and effort inertia
Discovery
1000309401
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-80884
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Koordinaten
Skalierung
dc.contributor.contributor
Other contributor
Publication history
Magdeburg : Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, [2017]
Content
1 Online-Ressource (26 Seiten, 0,97 MB) : Diagramme
Edition
Language
eng
Comment
Abstract
In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the impact of monetary instability on work relationships with incomplete contracts. We observe wage inertia, i.e. the reluctance to fully adjust nominal wages to the changes in the value of the currency, and effort inertia, i.e. the reluctance to fully adjust the work effort to the alterations of the real wages. Under inflation, these effects lead to cheaper labor and a shift of payoff shares to employers. Under deflation, we observe a higher cost of labor and a shift of payoff shares to employees. Additionally, inflation and deflation lower productivity and per capita earnings.
Series
Working paper series ; no. 2017, 12 ppn:58927368X