Colonnello, Stefano2025-05-292017https://epflicht.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/handle/123456789/4266880034300urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-683922514697I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.1 Online-Ressource (45 Seiten, V, 0,82 MB) : Illustrationenenghttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/330Book