Kleber, RainerReimann, MarcSouza, Gilvan C.Zhang, Weihua2025-05-302019kxp: 1686649193https://epflicht.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/handle/123456789/83601686649193urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-1171573024498We study the competition between two remanufacturers in the acquisition of used products and the sales of remanufactured products. One firm has a market advantage; we consider two separate cases where either firm could have an acquisition advantage. The problem is formulated as a simultaneous game on a market that is vertically differentiated in both acquisition and sales, where both firms decide on their respective acquisition prices for used products, and selling prices for remanufactured products. A key finding is that a market advantage is significantly more powerful than an acquisition advantage. The firm with a market advantage can preempt the entry of the other firm, even if that firm has a significant acquisition advantage, but not the other way around. This is accomplished through an aggressive acquisition strategy, where the firm with a market advantage sets significantly higher acquisition prices.1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten, 0,96 MB) : Tabellen, Diagrammeenghttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/330Book