Kirchkamp, OliverReiß, J. PhilippSadrieh, Abdolkarim2025-05-302006https://epflicht.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/handle/123456789/124171066773807urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-9388843259898We introduce a new method of varying the risk that bidders face in first-price private value auctions. We find that decreasing bidders' risk significantly reduces the degree of overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian-Nash equilibrium prediction. This implies that risk affects bidding behavior as generally expected in auction theory. While resolving a long-standing debate on the effect of risk on auction behavior, our results give rise to a new puzzle. As risk is diminished and overbidding decreases for most of the value range, a significant degree of underbidding sets in for very low values.1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten, 0,33 MB) : Diagrammeenghttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/381Book