How to play fair in international environmental agreements? : bridging psychological and economic methods / Cornelia Ohl; Heidi Ittner. Department of Economics
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Discovery
816517630
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-77901
DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Autorin / Autor
Beiträger
Körperschaft
Erschienen
Leipzig / Halle : UFZ-Umweltforschungszentrum Leipzig-Halle GmbH, 2005
Umfang
1 Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 0,14 MB)
Ausgabevermerk
Sprache
eng
Anmerkungen
Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen
Inhaltliche Zusammenfassung
Global public good provision (e.g. environmental quality) confronts us with problems demanding both national and international co-operation. However among sovereign nations reaching agreement on mutual public good provision is difficult. Slowing down global warming is just one example. Due to the diffusion of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere it is attractive for each individual state that other countries commit themselves to climate protection, whereas one's own state using the free-rider-strategy benefits from the protective measures of the others without making any costly national contribution. On the other hand such a strategic behaviour clashes with moral values, especially concerning motives of justice within society. Should free-riding be preferred from the strategic point of view or rather, out of consideration to justice, national commitments to contribute to climate protection? Therefore, an analysis of how appraisals of justice and strategic considerations interact is a challenge to international (environmental) policy. Taking a game-theoretic point of view, we analyse three psychological-empirical conceptions of justice: need, equality and equity, and point out how these principles are able to determine the type of game nations are expected to play.
Schriftenreihe
UFZ-Diskussionspapiere ; 22/2005 ppn:635135760